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An Open Question in Utah’s Open Courts
Jurisprudence: The Utah Wrongful Life Act and
Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center
I. INTRODUCTION
The sensitive issues and deeply held beliefs involved in this
country’s ongoing abortion debate have generated intense
controversy. Although the U.S. Supreme Court1 or Congress2 have
occasionally entered the fray, regulation of the specifics regarding
abortion is often left to individual states. In particular, states have
been able to determine whether parents can sue physicians for
medical advice and procedures related to birth and abortion. In the
wake of various state court decisions allowing such suits,3 and a
decade after the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Roe
v. Wade, the Utah legislature passed the Utah Wrongful Life Act4
(the “Wrongful Life Act” or the “Act”), prohibiting suits against
physicians for such advice or procedures.5 For twenty years, the Act
garnered only passing mention in Utah Supreme Court cases.6 But in
2002, the plaintiffs in Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center.7
challenged the Act as unconstitutional, thus ushering it into Utah’s
jurisprudential limelight.
This Note analyzes the Wood decision and the constitutionality
of the Wrongful Life Act. In doing so, it is intended neither to add
1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Most recently, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18
U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Gildener v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); Dumer v. St. Michael’s
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); see also Utah Legislative Survey—1983, 1984 UTAH L.
REV. 115, 222–24 (1984) [hereinafter Utah Legislative Survey].
4. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-11-23 to -25 (2002)).
5. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24.
6. See C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 507–08 (Utah 1988); Payne ex rel. Payne v.
Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 n.4 (Utah 1987).
7. 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003).
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to the extensive commentary on the constitutionality of abortion,
nor to make normative arguments for or against the practice. Rather,
it focuses both on the effect of the Wood decision and the
constitutionality of the Act as challenged under the “open courts”
clause of Utah’s constitution. This Note first argues that the
alignment of the Justices in Wood left at least part of the
constitutional question unanswered. Next, it suggests an alternative
to the conflicting standards of review used both in Wood and in past
Utah decisions. Finally, it argues that, regardless of the standard of
review used, the Act should be upheld as constitutional.
Part II of this Note gives background information on the
Wrongful Life Act and the Utah Constitution’s “open courts”
clause. Part III describes the facts, procedural history, and holding of
Wood. Part IV analyzes the Wood opinions: Part IV.A recommends a
standard of review in open courts cases, and Part IV.B asserts that
the Wrongful Life Act was properly upheld as constitutional. Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Utah Wrongful Life Act
On February 28, 1983, the Utah Legislature passed the
Wrongful Life Act.8 It came in response to court decisions in other
states allowing recovery for wrongful life9 and wrongful birth10 and
was intended to prevent such suits.11 Utah was one of the first states
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-11-23 to -25 (2002)).
9. “Wrongful life actions are those brought by or on behalf of an infant, usually
physically or mentally impaired, and allege that the child was born into a disadvantaged form of
life because of another’s negligence.” William Shane Topham, Note, Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Action and the Impact of Utah’s Statutory Breakwater,
1984 UTAH L. REV. 833, 834; see also Payne, 743 P.2d at 187 n.2.
10. “[W]rongful birth actions are brought by the parents in their own right, demanding
compensation for costs related to the birth and rearing of the child.” Topham, supra note 9, at
834 (footnote omitted); see also Payne, 743 P.2d at 187 n.1; Jennifer R. Granchi, Comment,
The Wrongful Birth Tort: A Policy Analysis and the Right to Sue for an Inconvenient Child, 43
S. TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1265–66 (2002).
11. See supra note 3. Utah Legislative Survey, supra note 3, a law review article
contemporary with the Act, indicated that at least one legislator thought the Act was intended
to prevent abortions, id. at 224 & n.747, and that an author of the Act intended it to prevent
routine genetic testing and thus abortions, id. at 224 & nn.749–52. The article determined,
however, that the Act “fails to implement legislative intent.” Id. at 224.
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to enact a law prohibiting actions for wrongful birth, though several
other states have enacted similar laws.12
The first section of Utah’s statute declares that it is the public
policy of Utah “to encourage all persons to respect the right to life
of all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition or
dependency, including all persons with a disability and all unborn
persons.”13 Based on that policy, section 78-11-24 states that “[a]
cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or
omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to
have been born alive but would have been aborted.”14
Although there was some speculation at the time of enactment
that the Act may violate a woman’s right to an abortion,15 no such
12. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1) (Michie 1998) (“A cause of action shall not arise, and
damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act
or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but
would have been aborted.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (West 1998) (“A person may not
maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on the person’s behalf based on the
claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, the person would have been aborted.”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2003) (“(1) A person shall not bring a civil
action on a wrongful birth claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child or
children would not or should not have been born. . . . (4) The prohibition . . . applies
regardless of whether the child is born healthy or with a birth defect or other adverse medical
condition.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(2) (West 1998) (“No person shall maintain a
cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct
of another, a child would have been aborted.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130(2) (West 1996)
(“No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on the
claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.”); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 1998) (“There shall be no cause of action or award of
damages on behalf of any person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the
defendant, a person once conceived would not or should not have been born.”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (Michie 1987) (“There shall be no cause of action or award of
damages on behalf of any person based on the claim of that person that, but for the conduct of
another, he would not have been conceived or, once conceived, would not have been
permitted to have been born alive.”). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) (“No cause
of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have
been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.”); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (West 2000) (“Damages for the birth of an unhealthy
child born as the result of professional negligence shall be limited to damages associated with
the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1996)
(“No person may maintain a claim for relief or receive an award for damages on that person’s
own behalf based on the claim that, but for the act or omission of another, that person would
have been aborted.”).
13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (2002).
14. Id. § 78-11-24. The final section of the Act disallows use of “failure or refusal of any
person to prevent the live birth of a person” as a defense in any action. Id. § 78-11-25.
15. Utah Legislative Survey, supra note 3, at 225–26.
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claim made it to the Utah Supreme Court for twenty years. In the
two cases that mentioned the statute, it either was found to not
apply to the plaintiff’s claim16 or was not considered because the
plaintiffs’ claim was otherwise barred.17 In Wood v. University of Utah
Medical Center,18 however, the court directly confronted a
constitutional challenge to the Act.
B. The Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution
One ground for challenging the Act as unconstitutional was a
provision of the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 11—the “open
courts” clause19—provides the following:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.20

“Open courts” or “remedies” clauses such as Utah’s have a
strong common law background, dating from Sir Edward Coke’s
restatement of the Magna Carta.21 Delaware was the first state to
adopt such a clause into its constitution,22 and at present forty states
contain a similar guarantee.23 These clauses were intended to serve
two principal purposes: first, to establish an independent foundation
16. C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 507–08 (Utah 1988).
17. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189–90 (Utah 1987).
18. 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002).
19. Id. at 439.
20. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
21. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (1995); see also Craftsman Builder’s
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1204 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 1285.
23. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1309 (2003). But see David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201
n.25 (1992) (thirty-nine states). The discrepancy appears to arise from the latter author’s
omission of Georgia, see GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 12 (1998), although Schuman (but not
Phillips) concludes that New Mexico includes a common-law guarantee, see Richardson v.
Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1988), and Phillips (but not
Schuman) concludes that Washington’s constitution implicitly recognizes a remedy guarantee,
see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. See also John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State
Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 237 n.1
(1991). Regardless, the right to a remedy is widely recognized in a majority of states.
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for the judiciary, and second, “to grant individuals rights to a judicial
remedy for the protection of their person, property, or reputation
from abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests
that could control state legislatures.”24
The open courts clause in the Utah Constitution, according to
an early Utah Supreme Court case, was specifically intended to place
“a limitation upon the Legislature to prevent that branch of the state
government from closing the doors of the courts against any person
who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some
known remedy.”25 Later Utah Supreme Court cases have construed
the clause to provide both procedural and substantive guarantees.26
The procedural guarantees are somewhat akin to those of the due
process clause: “access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is
based on fairness and equality.”27 The substantive guarantee is that
“an individual c[an]not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies
designed to protect basic individual rights.”28
There are, however, limitations on the reach of Utah’s open
courts clause. Construed too broadly, this clause might permanently
prevent the legislature from enacting tort reform or caps on
damages, exercising governmental immunity, or even passing statutes
of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court, therefore, has indicated
that “[article I,] section 11 rights are not always paramount . . . .
They do not sweep all other constitutional rights and prerogatives
before them. They . . . must be weighed against and harmonized
with other constitutional provisions.”29
In addition, the open courts clause is not intended to create new
rights or give new remedies. “Where no right of action is given . . .
or no remedy exists, under either the common law or some statute,
[the open courts clause] create[s] none.”30 It is also not intended to
“constitutionalize[] the common law or otherwise freeze[] the law
governing private rights and remedies as of the time of statehood.”31
Finally, it is not meant to inhibit the legislature’s “great latitude in
24. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, 974 P.2d at 1205 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366–67 (Utah 1915).
26. There has been substantial controversy in Utah over whether the open courts clause
includes substantive guarantees. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
27. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 677.
30. Brown, 151 P. at 367.
31. Berry, 717 P.2d at 676.
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defining, changing, and modernizing the law,” or its ability to
“create new rules of law and abrogate old ones.”32
C. The Berry Test
The leading Utah case interpreting the open courts clause is
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.33 In that case, the Utah
Supreme Court developed a two-prong test for evaluating whether
legislation challenged under the open courts clause is constitutional.
Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy or
cause of action withstands an open courts challenge only if it meets
one of two requirements:
[(1)] the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy “by due course of law” for vindication of his
constitutional interest[, or] . . .
[(2)] there is [(i)] a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated
and [(ii)] the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.34

The Berry test is straightforward: if the legislature takes away a
remedy, it either must have done so to eliminate a clear evil in a
reasonable way, or it must provide a reasonable alternative. This test
is designed to guide the courts in cases where the legislature has
acted to limit or eliminate a judicially enforceable remedy. For
example, in Berry, the court applied this test to invalidate a statute of
repose for products liability.35 As the lead opinion in Wood pointed
out, “[i]nherent in [the Berry test] is whether the statute abrogated
an existing remedy or cause of action.”36 If no remedy has been
abrogated, the two prongs of the test are not even implicated.
32. Id. Because “legal causes of action which provide remedies that protect section 11
interests may, in some cases, have to yield to the power of the Legislature to promote the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare,” id. at 677, legislatures can properly create statutory
remedies—for example, worker’s compensation acts—that replace the common law remedy.
33. 717 P.2d 670.
34. Id. at 680.
35. Id. at 681.
36. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 442 (Utah 2002). The Wood
dissent agreed. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The first step in deciding whether the
Act violates the constitutional guarantee of a remedy is to determine whether the Act
abrogated an existing legal remedy.”); see also Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021
(Utah 2002) (“[W]e must first determine whether a cause of action has been abrogated by the
legislative enactment.”).
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Although there were no dissenters in Berry, the framework that it
established has since been challenged. One Utah Supreme Court
Justice said of the Berry test: “[i]t is subject to manipulation, . . . it
leads to absurd results, and it distorts our relationship with the
legislature.”37 Another added that “this test permits a majority of this
court to substitute its judgment of what constitutes good public
policy for the judgment of the legislature” and asserted that “the
Berry test is a straw man analytical framework that permits one to
justify a predetermined outcome.”38 One scholar described the Berry
opinion as “typical of the activist use of the remedies provision,”39
using “wishful thinking,”40 and “almost casual[ly] invalidating” the
law at issue in that case.41 Finally, the historical analysis used in Berry
has been criticized.42 Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, majorities
in the Utah Supreme Court continue to use the Berry test, most
recently in the 2002 case Laney v. Fairview City.43 Berry was
therefore controlling precedent when the Wood case arose.
III. WOOD V. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CENTER
A. Factual Background
Fifteen years after the legislature passed the Wrongful Life Act,
Marie Wood discovered she was pregnant. She and her husband,
Terry, sought treatment from the University of Utah Medical
Center.44 Specifically, they sought to learn whether, because of
Marie’s age,45 there was a higher risk that the child would be born
37. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
38. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1029–30 (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. Bauman, supra note 23, at 270.
40. Id. at 271.
41. Id. at 271 n.205.
42. See Daniel W. Lewis, Note, Utah’s Emerging Constitutional Weapon—The Open
Courts Provision: Condemarin v. University Hospital, 1990 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1109 n.20
(“[T]he Berry court . . . ignore[d scholars who pointed out that] history suggests that open
courts provisions were never intended to have any bearing on legislative power. Rather, these
provisions represented a uniquely judicial guarantee aimed at remedying judicial favoritism,
excessive filing fees, or other discriminatory procedural mechanisms . . . .” (emphasis added)).
43. 57 P.3d at 1021–27. It was there used to invalidate a governmental immunity
statute. Id.
44. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 439 (Utah 2002).
45. Marie was 43 years old. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Wood v. Univ. of Utah
Med. Ctr., 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003) (No. 03-82).
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with a genetic disorder. Doctors at the Medical Center performed
tests in early 1998, the results of which indicated that there was an
eighty-five percent probability that the child would be born with
Down syndrome.46 The couple claimed they were not informed of
the results of the tests until late March and that the doctors
tempered the news by saying that, because the tests often resulted in
false positives, the chances of Marie having a child with Down
syndrome were actually quite small.47 In August 1998, Marie gave
birth to a baby girl, Mary Lorraine.48 Although she was otherwise
healthy, Mary Lorraine was diagnosed with Down syndrome.49
B. Procedural History
The parents filed suit against the Medical Center in Utah state
court.50 They alleged that employees of the Medical Center
negligently performed and interpreted the prenatal tests, and failed
to provide the couple sufficient information to make an informed
decision about whether to abort their child.51 The couple also
included claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
failure to obtain informed consent.52 Finally, recognizing that the
Act would bar their claim, the couple included a fourth “cause of
action”—a challenge to the constitutionality of section 78-11-24 of
the Act.53
In response, the Medical Center filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, claiming that the Wrongful Life Act barred all of the
couple’s claims.54 The district court granted the motion.55 Plaintiffs
appealed, attacking the constitutionality of section 78-11-24 on
several grounds.56 They claimed that it violated the open courts
clause of the Utah Constitution, the due process clauses of both the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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federal and Utah constitutions, and equal protection guarantees in
both the federal and Utah constitutions.57
On the last day of 2002, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s decision.58 The court was highly fractured, with only
two of the five justices joining in a lead opinion.59 The Chief Justice
wrote a vigorous dissent, joined in full by another justice.60 Finally,
Justice Howe agreed with the first part of the Chief Justice’s dissent61
but concurred in the result of several major parts of the lead
opinion62—thus providing what seemed to be a majority in favor of
upholding the constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act.
C. The Open Courts Holding in Wood
1. The lead and dissenting opinions
Despite the limited reach of Utah’s open courts clause, the Wood
plaintiffs claimed that because the Act eliminated their ability to
recover for the Medical Center’s alleged negligence, it violated the
open courts clause.63 In evaluating this claim, the lead opinion and
the dissent disagreed on two “open courts questions.”64 They
disagreed first as to the degree of deference afforded the legislature
when any statute is challenged under the open courts clause (the
standard of review) and second as to the constitutionality of the
Wrongful Life Act.
The lead opinion, authored by Justice Wilkins and joined by
Justice Durrant, answered both open courts questions in Part I of
57. Id. Although each of these challenges to the Act presents important constitutional
issues, this Note deals solely with the open courts question. A majority of the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act on each of the other challenges. Id. at 447–49.
58. Id. at 436.
59. Id. at 450. Because of ambiguity and potential confusion in the Wood opinions,
discussed below, this Note refrains from referring to any one opinion as the “majority”
opinion. For purpose of this Note, Justice Wilkins’s opinion is termed the “lead opinion” and
Chief Justice Durham’s opinion is termed the “dissent” or “dissenting opinion” (although it
commanded a majority on one issue).
60. Id. at 461 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). This other justice also filed a separate dissent.
Id. (Russon, J., concurring in Chief Justice Durham’s dissenting opinion).
61. Id. (Howe, J., concurring in Part I of Chief Justice Durham’s dissenting opinion).
62. Id. at 450 (Howe, J., concurring in part). As Part III.C of this Note indicates,
however, the opinions failed to conclusively resolve the open courts challenge.
63. Id. at 441.
64. Throughout this Note, reference is made to the two issues relating to the open
courts clause—(1) standard of review and (2) constitutionality—as “open courts questions.”
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that opinion. In Part I.A, Justice Wilkins concluded that the proper
standard of review for open courts cases is a presumption of
constitutionality.65 In Part I.B, he evaluated the constitutionality of
the Act, concluding that “[t]he Utah Wrongful Life Act does not
violate the Open Courts Clause.”66 However, since the Utah
Supreme Court is currently composed of five justices,67 and since
only two of the justices joined in the lead opinion, that opinion did
not command a majority on either of these conclusions.68
In contrast, Chief Justice Durham concluded in Part I of the
dissenting opinion that open courts challenges should be analyzed
using heightened scrutiny.69 In Part II, she concluded that “the
Act . . . violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution,” and
would therefore have struck it down as unconstitutional.70 Justices
Russon and Howe joined in the dissenting opinion on the standard
of review issue, but only Justice Russon joined the dissent in finding
a violation of the open courts clause.71
2. The unusual result
The Wood holding on the two open courts questions is not
immediately obvious. Clearly, there was a majority on the standard
of review issue—three of the five justices held that the proper
standard is one of heightened scrutiny.72 However, on the second
65. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440–41.
66. Id. at 450.
67. UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 2; An Overview of the Utah Supreme Court, at
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
68. However, some phrases from the lead opinion indicate that its author assumed that
it commanded a majority vote on both of the open courts questions. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441 n.1
(“[W]e apply the Berry test to the instant case to reach the decision of this court, that the
challenged legislation is constitutional.”); id. at 443 (“We therefore hold that the legislation in
question was a constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the Open
Courts Clause.”); id. at 450 (“The Utah Wrongful Life Act does not violate the Open Courts
Clause . . . and we therefore uphold the Act as constitutional.”); id. (“[T]he decision of the
district court is affirmed.”).
69. Id. at 450–52 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 461 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
72. Although Chief Justice Durham notes in dissent that “the majority of this court
upholds a heightened standard of review” for open courts cases and asserts that this fact
“undermines the legal analysis in this decision and the lead opinion’s conclusion that the Act is
constitutional,” id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting), she later seems to treat the lead opinion
as being supported by a majority, id. at 451–52 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the
lead opinion’s standard “opens questions about the standards this court has applied to review
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issue (the constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act), two justices
voted to uphold the statute as constitutional,73 and two justices
voted to find it unconstitutional.74 Because Justice Howe expressed
no opinion on the constitutionality of the Act,75 neither position
commanded a majority of the court.
Given this alignment, the statute was upheld as constitutional for
two reasons. First, it was upheld because the Utah Constitution
requires that for a statute to be found unconstitutional, a majority of
the court must so vote.76 The second, and more procedurally
interesting, reason is that when an appellate court is equally divided
on an issue, the ruling of the lower court is affirmed.77 Because the
lower court found the Wrongful Life Act to be constitutional,78 the
Act’s constitutionality, as challenged under the open courts clause,
was affirmed by an equally divided court. Though affirmance by an
equally divided court is not without precedent in Utah79 or other
jurisdictions,80 it is nonetheless the exceptional case where an equal
challenges to all article 1 rights. I believe this approach is incorrect and unwise.”). See also
Marie Wood and Terry Borman v. University of Utah Medical Center, 18 ISSUES L. & MED.
275 (2003) (omitting the dissenting opinion, apparently concluding that the lead opinion
commanded a majority on all issues).
73. Wood, 67 P.3d at 443 (“We therefore hold that the legislation in question was a
constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the Open Courts Clause.”).
74. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The Act therefore violates article I, section
11 of the Utah Constitution.”).
75. See id. at 450 (“Justice Howe concurs in the result in parts II and III of Justice
Wilkins’ opinion.”); id. at 461 (“Justice Howe concurs in Part I of Chief Justice Durham’s
dissenting opinion.”).
76. UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 2 (“The [Utah Supreme C]ourt shall not declare any law
unconstitutional . . . except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme
Court.”).
77. See Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1337 (Utah 1987) (“We are evenly divided
[on one of the plaintiff’s claims] . . . and we must affirm the summary judgment on that
issue.”); Stimpson v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 31 P. 449, 450 (Utah Terr. 1892) (“The court
being equally divided in opinion, this judgment is affirmed.”); see also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate
Review § 832 (2003) (“Where an appellate court is equally divided on an appeal before it, the
decision below is generally considered to be affirmed.”). See generally William L. Reynolds &
Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62
N.C. L. REV. 29 (1983) (describing the history of this rule and criticizing automatic affirmance
by an equally divided court); Daniel Egger, Note, Court of Appeals Review of Agency Action:
The Problem of En Banc Ties, 100 YALE L.J. 471 (1990).
78. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440.
79. See supra note 77.
80. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003); Massachusetts v.
White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978); Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); Jean v. Collins, 221
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000); Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc); Anderson v. State ex rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska
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division is due to one justice’s failure to express an opinion on an
issue, rather than to, because of recusal or other reasons, there being
an even number of justices participating in the decision. In Wood, the
affirmance is somewhat ironic, given that the only two justices who
voted to affirm used a deferential standard of review in their analysis,
whereas a majority held that heightened scrutiny is the proper
standard.
Nor was the equal divide the end of the complex Wood
proceedings. Justice Howe, who had expressed no opinion on the
constitutionality of the Act vis-à-vis the open courts clause,81 retired
on December 31, 2002.82 Wood was one of the last two cases he
participated in as a Utah Supreme Court Justice; the opinions were
filed on the day he retired.83 Two months later, on February 26,
2003, Justice Jill Parrish was confirmed by the Utah Senate as Justice
Howe’s replacement on the Utah Supreme Court.84 Because
“rehearings have been granted in situations where [a c]ourt had
affirmed judgments by [an] equally divided court[], but soon
thereafter a new justice was appointed, who could break the tie on
rehearing,”85 her appointment opened the possibility of a rehearing
2003); DeStefano v. Nichols ex rel. Nichols, 84 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2004); Benson v. First Trust
& Sav. Bank, 145 So. 182 (Fla. 1932); Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d
1332 (Ill. 1984); State v. Henriksen, No. 02-1329, 2004 WL 345514 (Iowa Feb. 25, 2004);
State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2002); Pierce v. Pierce, 767 P.2d 292
(Kan. 1989); Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp., 661 A.2d 796 (N.J. 1995); Tate v. Christy,
454 S.E.2d 242 (N.C. 1995); Felton v. Hosp. Guild of Thomasville, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 297
(N.C. 1982); State v. Cargill, 851 P.2d 1141 (Or. 1993); Christensen v. Epley, 601 P.2d
1216, 1218 (Or. 1979); State v. Pine, 45 P.3d 151 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Stair, 699 A.2d 1250 (Pa. 1997); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 789 (Va. App. 2004).
81. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 450, 461.
82. Elizabeth Neff, Colleagues, Friends Honor Retired Justice Howe, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Jan. 16, 2003, http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Jan/01162003/Utah/20631.asp.
83. Supreme Court Opinions by Date—2002, at http://www.utcourts.gov/
opinions/supopin/scbydate02.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
84. Elizabeth Neff, Senate OKs Two Supreme Court Justices, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 27,
2003, http://www.sltrib.com/2003/Feb/02272003/utah/33295.asp.
85. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 892 (2003); see, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 349 U.S. 902 (1955), reh’g granted, 349 U.S. 926 (1955), different result
reached on reh’g, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Indian Towing
Co. on October 14, 1954—five days after the death of Justice Robert Jackson. Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 348 U.S. 810 (1955). Although Justice Harlan replaced Justice Jackson
on March 16, 1955, he did not participate in Indian Towing Co., which was decided on April
11 of that year. Indian Towing Co., 349 U.S. at 902. After Justice Harlan’s appointment, on
May 16, the Court subsequently granted a rehearing. Indian Towing Co., 349 U.S. at 926. On
rehearing, the court reached a different result, entering a final judgment on November 21.
Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 61.
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of the Wood case. In fact, a petition for rehearing was made, but was
denied on April 14, 2003.86 The U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari on October 14, 2003.87
3. Precedential value
As a result of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision to not rehear
the case and the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the
constitutionality of the Wrongful Life Act was conclusively affirmed
on all counts. However, because the affirmance of constitutionality
under the open courts clause was by an equally divided court, its
value as precedent may be considerably diminished or possibly even
nonexistent.88 At the very least, it is clear that the Utah Supreme
Court has yet to conclusively decide the constitutionality of the Act
86. Wood, 67 P.3d at 436. The denial of the request for rehearing is not very surprising.
Utah does not allow judges who join the Supreme Court after the court has rendered its
decision in a case (in Wood, that date was December 31, 2002) to participate in the
consideration of a petition for rehearing. Cordner v. Cordner, 64 P.2d 828, 828–29 (Utah
1937). Therefore, Justice Parrish did not participate in the vote. Also, Justice Russon retired in
early 2003—possibly before the vote on the petition for rehearing—and his replacement,
Justice Nehring, would have been unable to vote on the petition due to the Cordner rule.
Therefore, the only Justices who considered the petition for rehearing were Justices Wilkins
and Durrant (who, respectively, wrote and concurred in the lead opinion), Chief Justice
Durham (who authored the main dissent), and possibly Justice Russon (who joined in the
dissent). It seems probable, then, that the vote for rehearing ended in either a 2–1 vote,
against, or a 2–2 deadlock.
87. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 124 S. Ct. 388 (2003) (No. 03-82). The denial
of certiorari was of minor importance on the open courts questions because the U.S. Supreme
Court almost certainly would not have interfered with the Utah Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a state constitutional provision, since the U.S. Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction over such interpretations. See 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1993) (defining the U.S. Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts).
88. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 293 (1996) (“[T]he judgment is not
entitled to precedential weight because it amounts at best to an unexplained affirmance by an
equally divided court.” (emphasis added)); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (“Nor is
an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight.”); Stupak-Thrall v.
United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Moore, C.J., concurring)
(stating that since the court was equally divided, “this case has resulted in no law of the
circuit”); Hudgins Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v. Am. Exp. Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D.
Tenn. 2003); Anderson v. State ex. rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710, 713
(Alaska 2003) (“An affirmance by an evenly divided court is not binding precedent.”). But see
Harper v. Harper, 491 So. 2d 189, 202 (Miss. 1986) (“Prior decisions of this Court have said
that an affirmance by an equally divided court is binding precedent unless and until the same is
overruled.”); Egger, supra note 77, at 473 n.7 (“Potential litigants will of course be able to
predict how the same court will dispose of the same issue in the future, which means that
affirmance by an equally divided court can in fact both change the law and influence future
decision making.”).
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under the open courts clause. The two current Utah Supreme Court
justices who did not participate in the Wood decision have yet to rule
on the issue, and in a subsequent challenge to the Act their votes
could bridge the equal divide in Wood for one side or the other.89
In any event, there is room for a subsequent plaintiff to make the
argument, at the very least without fear of sanctions,90 and with what
would seem to be at least even odds of success,91 that the Act violates
the open courts clause. In fact, such a plaintiff’s case would be
strengthened by the holding of a majority of the justices in Wood
that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review in
open courts cases.92 Unless a majority of the current court is willing
to overrule the Wood holding on the standard of review question, a
subsequent open courts attack would require analyzing the Act using
heightened scrutiny. Part IV.A of this Note discusses in more detail
the conflict over the appropriate standard of review, and Part IV.B
analyzes whether the court should overrule the Wood court’s standard
of review holding.

89. As explained supra note 86, the court’s refusal to rehear the Wood case does not
indicate acquiescence in the decision by the new justices, as they were not allowed to
participate in the consideration of the petition for rehearing. See Cordner, 64 P.2d at 828; see
also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 31 (2003) (“Although there is authority for the view that where
an appellate court is reconstituted after the decision of the case but before the time for filing a
petition for rehearing has run or before the decision on such a petition has been made, the new
judges may participate in the decision on the petition for rehearing, there is also authority to
the contrary.” (footnotes omitted)); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 677 (2003) (“Where there has
been a change in the membership of the court since the original hearing, a petition for
rehearing should be heard and acted on only by the members of the court participating in the
original decision.”).
90. Challenging the essentially undecided question of the Wrongful Life Act’s
constitutionality vis-à-vis the open courts clause would not trigger sanctions since it would not
violate the Utah rule requiring that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [in a
pleading] are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” UTAH R. CIV. P.
11(b)(2).
91. Of the four justices who have considered the question, two have come down on
each side. Based solely on this statistic, a plaintiff would appear to have a 50/50 chance of
success in a subsequent claim.
92. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Standard of Review in Open Courts Cases

The standard of review conflict between the lead and dissenting
Wood opinions is but one instance of an ongoing debate in the Utah
Supreme Court regarding article I, section 11.93 Although a
presumption of constitutionality is undeniably proper “where no
significant constitutional right is claimed to have been abrogated”94
and the presumption clearly must give way when certain
constitutional rights are at issue, there is substantial disagreement as
to whether the open courts clause guarantees significant rights that
implicate heightened scrutiny. As indicated above in Part III.C, the
dissent in Wood actually garnered a majority vote on this issue, which
held that heightened scrutiny is required in open courts cases.95 This
section analyzes the standard of review analysis in both the lead and
dissenting opinions and ultimately recommends following a different
approach, derived in part from the Utah Court of Appeals decision in
Currier v. Holden.96
1. The dissent’s open courts standard of review
Although a majority of the court agreed with the standard of
review advocated in the dissenting opinion, the dissent’s argument
was nonetheless written as a reaction to the lead opinion.97 The
dissent asserted that the lead opinion’s “brief, two-paragraph
[standard of review] analysis . . . abandoned [the] carefully crafted
and long relied-on analytic model” in open courts cases, choosing
instead to use a “blunt instrument”—presumption of
constitutionality.98 Such a presumption, the dissent emphasized,
should not apply when a significant constitutional right is claimed to

93. The debate is evident in the conflicts between the majority and dissenting opinions
in various Utah cases. See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002); Craftsman
Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999); Condemarin v. Univ.
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670 (Utah 1985).
94. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 450 (Utah 2002).
95. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
96. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
97. This further compounded the confusion as to the Wood holding. See supra note 68.
98. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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have been violated.99 The dissent focused on three reasons for using
heightened scrutiny in analyzing open courts cases: the open courts
clause’s location in article I next to other important rights, the
importance of the rights protected by the open courts clause, and
past Utah Supreme Court precedent using heightened scrutiny in
open courts cases.100 For these reasons, according to the dissent,
legislation challenged using that section must be analyzed using
heightened scrutiny.
The Chief Justice first relied on the open courts clause’s location
in article I to support a heightened scrutiny standard. She disputed
what she characterized as the lead opinion’s claim that “article I,
section 11 rights are ‘no more important and [have] no greater
weight as a constitutional provision than other constitutional
provisions.’”101 She argued instead that a constitutional provision
that protects significant individual rights is more important than
provisions that do not protect such rights and should therefore
trigger a heightened scrutiny standard.102 To support this claim, she
stated that
article I of the Utah Constitution, known as the “Declaration of
Rights,” contains affirmative guarantees of specific individual rights
that are indeed fundamental. Article I, section 11 rights are no
more important than other article I rights, but . . . most, if not all,
of these rights have generated some form of heightened judicial
scrutiny.103
99. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original). Confusingly, the text she
included in quotation marks does not appear anywhere within the lead opinion. Perhaps it is a
reference to an earlier draft of that opinion.
102. The dissent quoted from a 1941 concurring opinion to that effect: “[A] court will
exercise stricter scrutiny in evaluating measures that encroach upon civil liberties than it will
with respect to statutes that impact . . . only economic interests.” Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (Utah 1941) (Wolfe, J.,
concurring)).
103. Id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Although this language avoids explicitly
calling article I, section 11 rights “fundamental,” it does (1) indicate that at least some (perhaps
all) article I rights are fundamental, and (2) imply that section 11 rights are as important as
other (perhaps all other) article I rights. At the very least, Chief Justice Durham is asserting
that section 11 rights are closely related to fundamental rights, and she may be implicitly
asserting that they are fundamental. But see id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“Although
this court has not recognized the guarantee included in article I, section 11 as ‘fundamental,’
as Justice Zimmerman has noted, ‘I do not think we intended to denigrate the importance of
the rights protected from legislative abridgement by article I, section 11. . . .’ This court has
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She then listed eight article I rights104 and, for each,105 cited at
least one Utah case where the court used heightened scrutiny in
analyzing legislation that was challenged based on the article I
right.106 The Chief Justice concluded that “this court has consistently
applied various forms of heightened review when article I rights are
at issue.”107
The dissent then asserted that rights guaranteed in the open
courts clause are likewise important rights. She asserted that the
open courts clause is meant to “protect injured persons who are
isolated in society and lack political influence by guaranteeing them
access to the courts.”108 That clause guarantees “‘the availability of
legal remedies for vindicating the great interest that individuals . . .
have in the integrity of their persons, property, and reputations.’”109
The drafters of the Utah Constitution included the open courts
clause, the Chief Justice asserted, because they “understood that the
‘normal political processes would not always protect the common
law rights of all citizens to obtain remedies for injuries.’”110
Therefore, the rights protected by the open courts clause are
important rights that must be analyzed using heightened scrutiny.
The Chief Justice also relied on past Utah Supreme Court cases
in which the court “consistently rejected the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes challenged under the remedies clause of
article I, section 11.”111 She cited only one such case, Condemarin v.

wisely avoided the ‘analytical straitjacket’ of federal equal protection analysis by avoiding a rigid
test that dictates that some rights are fundamental and others are not.” (quoting Condemarin
v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 367 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring))). Ultimately,
it is unclear whether the Chief Justice thinks that article I, section 11 rights are “fundamental,”
or what that would even mean in the context of Utah’s standard of review analysis.
104. The eight rights (nine, if freedom of speech and the press are separated) are:
“religious liberty, habeas corpus, the right to bear arms, due process of law, the rights of
accused persons, [protection against] unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of speech
and of the press, [and] the protection against taking private property for public use without
compensation.” Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
105. No case was cited for the right to bear arms. Id. at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 450–51 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985)).
109. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 677 n.4).
110. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Laney v. Fairvew City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1007
(Utah 2002)).
111. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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University Hospital,112 and included quotations from two of that
case’s concurring opinions in support of heightened scrutiny.113 The
first concurrence in Condemarin argued that to presume
constitutionality in open courts cases “is to fail to give any greater
weight to a constitutional right than to a nonconstitutional interest,
such as a general social or economic interest.”114 The second
concurrence stated that “the presumption of validity . . . must be
reversed once it is shown that [a statute] . . . does, in fact, infringe
upon the interests enumerated in article I, section 11.”115
Although the lead opinion had cited conflicting precedent—
three Utah Supreme Court cases in support of a presumption of
constitutionality standard116—the Chief Justice found those cases to
be irrelevant.117 First, she discounted presumption language in
Zamora v. Draper,118 arguing that the court used article I, section 11
“to interject a ‘higher principle[] of justice’ that provided the
plaintiff a remedy that he would not have had under the statute
alone. . . . In essence, the court found the statute unconstitutional as
applied . . . .”119 She next dismissed the lead opinion’s second case,
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead,120 as a case that “did not
deal with article I, section 11.”121 Finally, she noted that in Lindon
City v. Engineers Construction Co.,122 the court did not rely on a
112. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). However, she presumably also referred to Berry, Allen,
and Laney, all previously cited in her opinion. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450, 451 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting).
113. Wood, 67 P.3d at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
114. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 370 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., separate
opinion).
115. Id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). Justice Zimmerman later
abandoned his support for this line of analysis. See Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler
Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). In her own
Condemarin opinion (not quoted in Wood), Chief Justice Durham stated that “we [have]
committed ourselves to something more than a ‘rational basis’ deference [for open courts
cases].” 775 P.2d at 360.
116. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440 (citing Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d
916, 920 (Utah 1993); Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah
1981); Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981)).
117. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
118. 635 P.2d 78.
119. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Zamora, 635 P.2d at
81).
120. 870 P.2d 916.
121. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
122. 636 P.2d 1070.
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presumption of constitutionality, but “actually undertook a review of
the constitutionality of the [challenged statute],” despite observing
that the “plaintiff does not support the point [on constitutionality]
by any substantial meritorious argument.”123 The presumption
language in Lindon, she asserted, merely indicated “that the burden
of convincing the court of unconstitutionality lies with the
challenger;” it did not indicate “that the legislature needs no more
than a minimal reason for overriding a constitutional guarantee.”124
2. Problems with the dissent’s analysis
As indicated above, the dissent’s analysis in Wood commanded a
majority of the participating justices, thus holding heightened
scrutiny to be the appropriate standard of review in open courts
cases.125 Nonetheless, there were three important problems with the
dissent’s analysis: it overemphasized the significance of the location
of the open courts clause in article I, too quickly disregarded the
cases cited by the lead opinion, and misconstrued Utah precedent.
a. Overemphasis on the open courts clause’s location. The dissent
first argued that heightened scrutiny is required in open courts cases
because of that clause’s location in article I.126 The Chief Justice
stated that “most, if not all” article I rights have “generated some
form of heightened scrutiny.”127 However, one of the cases,
Whitehead, which she cited to show that challenges based on the
religious freedom guarantee of article I have generated heightened
scrutiny, does not support that proposition. In fact, the court in
Whitehead unhesitatingly stated that when a legislative enactment is
challenged as unconstitutional, “[t]he act is presumed valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”128 The
Chief Justice recognized this but essentially argued in Wood that the
presumption language, in which she joined,129 is a facade, since “the

123. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073).
124. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
125. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
127. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
128. Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).
129. Id. at 941.
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actual analysis undertaken by the court in that case cannot be
characterized as anything but heightened scrutiny.”130
While it is true that the Whitehead court engaged in extensive
analysis to determine whether the enactment at issue “survives
constitutional scrutiny,”131 it is far from clear that it applied
heightened scrutiny. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
the district court’s ruling that a city council’s practice of having
prayer before meetings violated the religious freedom guarantee of
the Utah Constitution.132 The city council had argued that the
practice should be upheld unless it was found to be
“unconstitutional ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”133 Although the
Whitehead court rejected this extremely deferential standard, it also
unequivocally stated that “the burden of showing the
unconstitutionality of the practice is on the [party challenging it].”134
In addition, the court upheld the constitutionality of the enactment
because the party challenging it could not show either that “the City
Council favored particular religions or religion in general in
scheduling participants,” or that “the City Council’s policy denied
any group or individual a realistically equal opportunity to participate
in favor of . . . religious groups or speakers.”135 Requiring this kind
of proof by the party challenging the enactment indicates deference
to the enactment, not heightened scrutiny.
There is a second weakness with the dissent’s defense of
heightened scrutiny based on the open courts clause’s location in
article I. Although the exact number may be debatable, there are
dozens of enumerated rights within article I of the Utah
Constitution—many more than the few listed in the dissent.136 It is
130. Wood, 67 P.3d at 450 n.1 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
131. Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 938.
132. Id. at 917–18.
133. Id. at 920.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 939.
136. There are over fifty independent rights listed in article I: The right to (1–2) enjoy
and defend one’s life and liberty; (3–5) acquire, possess, and protect property; (6) worship
according to the dictates of one’s conscience; (7) assemble peaceably; (8) protest against
wrongs; (9) petition for redress of grievances; (10) communicate freely one’s thoughts and
opinions; (11) alter or reform the government as the public welfare may require; (12) freedom
of conscience and religious liberty; (13) habeas corpus; (14) bear arms; (15) due process of
law; (16) bail for qualifying offenses; (17) avoid excessive bail or fines; (18) not be subject to
cruel and unusual punishments; (19) trial by jury; (20) open courts; (21) appear and defend in
person and by counsel; (22) demand the nature and cause of the accusation against one; (23)
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therefore certainly not true that “most, if not all” article I rights have
generated heightened scrutiny—only a small minority have done so,
and most article I rights have not even been used to challenge
legislation in the Utah courts. Although it is possible that heightened
scrutiny would be used for many of these rights, this “guilt by
association” argument for heightened scrutiny in open courts cases
cannot be definitive. This is particularly true since the court in
Whitehead did not use heightened scrutiny in examining a challenge
based on an article I right.137 Nonetheless, with the exception of
Whitehead, Chief Justice Durham correctly points out that using
heightened scrutiny in article I, section 11 cases is “entirely
consistent” with that used in other article I cases.138 This does carry
some weight, although less than the Chief Justice would attribute to
it.
b. Improper rejection of the lead opinion’s cited cases. The dissent
also inappropriately rejected the lead opinion’s cited cases. It first
argued that the Zamora court could not have used a deferential
standard of review.139 In Zamora, a plaintiff challenged as
unconstitutional a state statute requiring the posting of a bond in
suits against police officers.140 The court in Zamora, professing
have a copy of the accusation; (24) testify in one’s own behalf; (25) be confronted by the
witnesses against one; (26) have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
one’s behalf; (27) have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed; (28) appeal in all cases; (29) not be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure other rights of the accused; (30–31) not be
compelled to give evidence against oneself or one’s spouse; (32) not be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense; (33–35) be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (36) warrants based on probable cause; (37) freedom of
speech; (38) freedom of the press; (39) not be imprisoned for debt; (40) free elections; (41–
43) not be subject to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of
contracts; (44) not be not be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses;
(45) no quartering of soldiers without consent; (46) no slavery or involuntary servitude; (47)
no taking of private property for public use without compensation; (48) uniform operation of
general laws; and if one is a crime victim, the right to (49) be treated with fairness, respect, and
dignity; (50) be free from harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process; (51–
53) be informed of, present at, and heard at important criminal justice hearings; and (54) have
a sentencing judge receive and consider reliable information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense. UTAH CONST. art I, §§ 1–28.
137. See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text.
138. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 451 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting).
139. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
140. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah 1981).
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deference to the legislature, upheld the constitutionality of the
statute.141 It concluded, however, that a pure facial application of the
statute could conflict both with other statutes142 and the open courts
clause in that it could prevent the indigent from gaining access to the
courts.143 Concluding that the statute requiring the bond “should be
so interpreted and applied as to avoid conflict [with other statutes],
and to harmonize with . . . the Constitution,” the court thus held
that the statute contained an implicit exception in the case of
impecuniosity.144 In Wood, the dissent dismissed the deferential
language of Zamora, arguing that since the Zamora court “actually
used article I, section 11 to avoid a statute,” it could not have used a
deferential standard of review.145 However, a court’s recognition of a
potential constitutional conflict and interpretation of a statute to
avoid that conflict do not mean that the court used heightened
scrutiny. Rather, it is a further indication that the court was willing
to defer to the legislature: the court properly presumed that the
legislature intended to enact a constitutional statute and properly
interpreted it as such. The Wood dissent seems to argue that a court
may only engage in such statutory interpretation when using
heightened scrutiny. If that were true, then a court analyzing a
statute using heightened scrutiny could uphold the statute as
constitutional, whereas a court using a more deferential standard of
review would find it unconstitutional. This topsy-turvy result would
turn the normal understanding of standards of review on its head
and is untenable. The dissent’s rejection of Zamora is therefore out
of hand—there is no indication in Zamora of anything other than
deference to the legislature.
Second, the dissent improperly dismissed Whitehead as a case
that “did not deal with article I, section 11,” assuming that it was
therefore irrelevant.146 However, as shown above,147 the case is
relevant first because it is an example of an article I right not
generating heightened scrutiny. Second, Whitehead also supports the
lead opinion’s assertion that deference is proper when analyzing
141. Id. at 80.
142. This factor was not present in Wood.
143. Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80.
144. Id. at 81.
145. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 452 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
147. See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text.

914

ROP-FIN

893]

7/3/2004 2:18 PM

Utah’s Open Courts Jurisprudence

challenged legislation generally; the lead opinion simply refused to
find an exception to this rule for section 11. Finally, that Whitehead
did not deal specifically with section 11 does not make it irrelevant—
the dissent itself discussed multiple article I rights together, in
showing that “[t]he standard of review we have developed in section
11 cases is entirely consistent” with other article I standards.148 It is
inconsistent for the dissent to later criticize and dismiss the lead
opinion’s inclusion of a case involving another article I right in a
discussion of section 11.
c. Misinterpretation of Utah precedent. Finally, the dissent
improperly found that since the court in Lindon “actually undertook
a review of the constitutionality of the [challenged statute],” despite
observing that the “plaintiff does not support the point [on
constitutionality] by any substantial meritorious argument,” it must
have been using heightened scrutiny.149 That a court does not find
the plaintiff’s arguments “substantial” or persuasive does not prevent
the court from reviewing the constitutionality of the statute while
still using a deferential standard of review. Because the plaintiff in
Lindon argued that the challenged statute violated the constitution150
and because “[a]n appellate court may . . . properly review the
constitutionality of a statute [even if] the constitutional issue was not
suggested, briefed, or argued in the court below,”151 the Lindon
court’s decision to undertake a constitutional analysis does not
indicate that it used heightened scrutiny. In fact, the presumption
language in Lindon indicates otherwise.152 The dissent dismissed this
language as merely indicating that the challenger has the burden of
proving the unconstitutionality of the statute, not that only a
minimal reason is necessary for the legislature to override a
constitutional guarantee.153 However, this is a straw man—the lead
148. Wood, 67 P.3d at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981)).
150. 636 P.2d at 1074.
151. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 703 (2003).
152. 636 P.2d at 1073 (“Without satisfactory proof otherwise, constitutionality is
generally presumed. . . . ‘The first legal principle to be observed is that there is a presumption
that a statute is valid and constitutional; and one who questions it has the burden of
convincing [the] court of its unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Branch v. Salt Lake County Serv.
Area No. 2—Cottonwood Heights, 460 P.2d 814, 815 (Utah 1969)).
153. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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opinion makes no claim that the legislature needed only a “minimal
reason” to override a constitutional guarantee; nor does that follow
from use of a deferential standard. Ultimately, Whitehead is a
relevant case, and Lindon and Zamora are valid cases that conflict
with those cited by the Wood dissent.
Despite the dissent’s analytical problems, the standard it
advocates does have some merit. Applying heightened scrutiny in
open courts cases would help protect the rights of citizens to appeal
to the courts and help prevent overreaching by the legislature.
However, heightened scrutiny is an “extremely strict” standard that
“look[s] no further than . . . stated legislative objectives” and
“[does] not consider additional plausible or even possible
justifications.”154 It also “puts the burden on the statute to be a
rational means of correcting clear social or economic evil.”155 Under
this standard, “the plaintiff needs only to discredit the defendant’s
argument in favor of constitutionality” to prevail.156 This has the
potential of unduly hampering the legislature while expanding the
court’s role in defining policy.157 Nonetheless, since a majority in
Wood upheld this standard, it is still the law in Utah.
3. The lead opinion’s open courts standard of review
In evaluating the open courts challenge, Justice Wilkins’ lead
opinion took the approach that legislation is presumed
constitutional, even when challenged based on the open courts
clause.158 In support of this claim, the opinion cited Zamora,
Whitehead, and Lindon. From Zamora, the lead opinion quoted:
[T]he prerogative of the legislature as the creators of the law is to
be respected. Consequently, its enactments are accorded a
presumption of validity; and the courts do not strike down a
legislative act unless the interests of justice in the particular case

154. Bauman, supra note 23, at 270.
155. Id; see also Lewis, supra note 42, at 1116 (“The practical significance of the court’s
application of the open courts provision . . . is that the burden of demonstrating the
constitutionality of the challenged statute rests upon the party seeking to uphold the statute.”
(footnotes omitted)).
156. Lewis, supra note 42, at 1117.
157. See Bauman, supra note 23, at 271 (“It is not clear why the court’s powers and
abilities [would be] superior to the legislature’s.”).
158. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440 (stating that this deference requires “resolv[ing] any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality”)
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before it require doing so because the act is clearly in conflict with
the higher law as set forth in the Constitution.159

Based on that yardstick, the lead opinion asserted that the proper
standard of review in Wood should be a presumption of
constitutionality.160 As explained above,161 only Justices Wilkins and
Durrant urged the use of this analysis.
The lead opinion recognized that past decisions used a less
deferential standard in analyzing open courts cases but concluded
that those cases were in error.162 Because the court “has ‘not
hesitated . . . to reverse case law when [it is] firmly convinced that [it
has] erred,’” Justice Wilkins was willing to overrule those cases as far
as standard of review was concerned.163 He concluded that “[a]ny
heightened level of scrutiny simply because the constitutional
challenge is based on the Open Courts Clause is improper” and that
challenged legislation should be reviewed for correctness, “resolving
any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”164
In her dissent, Chief Justice Durham claimed that Justice
Wilkins’ standard of review stance stemmed from the fact, apparent
in his Laney dissent, that “he does not regard article I, section 11 as
having any substantive content.”165 If that is a true characterization
of the lead author’s view,166 it follows that he would see no
substantive rights in article I, section 11 requiring the protection of
heightened scrutiny.167 Even if Justice Wilkins had no such
underlying reason, he at least felt that in open courts cases there is
159. Id. (quoting Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981)).
160. Id. at 441.
161. See supra Part III.C.
162. Wood, 67 P.3d at 440.
163. Id. at 441 (quoting Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538, 544 n.3 (Utah 2001) (quoting
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 n.5 (Utah 1990))).
164. Id. at 440–41.
165. Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
166. Although this characterization is undercut by the lead opinion’s decision to adhere
to Laney, see id. at 441 n.1 (“Laney is controlling precedent from this court, and we are
cognizant of and respect the principle of stare decisis . . . .”), the lead opinion does state that
Justices Wilkins and Durrant “are still firmly convinced that the decision in Laney to adhere to
the Berry interpretation and test was erroneous.” Id.
167. Whether Justice Wilkins really believed that article I, section 11 has no substantive
content is unclear, since he does not address the issue in his opinion. It should be noted,
however, that there is considerable debate as to the substantive content of such clauses in Utah
and in other states. See Patrick E. Sullivan, Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An
Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150, 170–78 (1983)
(describing different states’ characterizations of open courts clauses).
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no reason to look beyond the standard presumption of
constitutionality that is used in, as he said, “all other such cases.”168
Unfortunately, it is not clear what “such cases” includes, and
there is little in the opinion to indicate what it encompasses. It is
possible that the lead opinion was intimating that every case where
legislation is challenged as unconstitutional requires “resolving any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.”169 This seems
unlikely, given the large body of state and federal law upholding
heightened scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review with
various constitutional challenges.170 “Such cases,” then, must have a
limited meaning. One possibility is that it means “all cases that do
not implicate[] a ‘fundamental or critical right’ or [the] creat[ion of
impermissible classifications].”171 If this is the correct interpretation,
the justices concurring in the lead opinion must not consider article
I, section 11 rights to be “fundamental,” “critical,” or “important”
enough to trigger additional scrutiny. While it is true that the Utah
Supreme Court “has not recognized the guarantee included in article
I, section 11 as ‘fundamental,’”172 this is in part because Utah does
not use a framework, analogous to that of federal equal protection,
of classifying different rights as “fundamental.”173 However, that
does not indicate that article I, section 11 rights are unimportant.174
In fact, the history of Utah’s open courts clause indicates that the
rights are important.175 The problem with the lead opinion’s
168. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) (discussing equal protection and
uniform operation of laws provisions); West Jordan v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 537
(Utah 1988) (analyzing uniform operation of the laws); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988) (same); see also Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d
1069, 1085 (Utah 2002) (“Where a legislative enactment implicates a ‘fundamental or critical
right’ or creates classifications which are ‘considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract,’
we apply a heightened degree of scrutiny.” (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., 903 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1995))).
171. See Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1085.
172. Wood, 67 P.3d at 452 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
173. See Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366–67 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring in part).
174. See id. at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part) (“[I]n declining to . . .
characterize the guarantee of a remedy of injuries [as fundamental], I do not think we intended
to denigrate the importance of th[os]e rights . . . . Instead, we simply avoided being bound
into the analytical straitjacket that has been fashioned out of the federal equal protection clause
. . . .”).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 21–28.

918

ROP-FIN

893]

7/3/2004 2:18 PM

Utah’s Open Courts Jurisprudence

standard is that it does not give much weight to the protections of
article I, section 11. There seem to be some situations where
presuming constitutionality in the face of an open courts challenge
does not appropriately protect the rights of individuals.
4. An alternative standard of review
Both the lead opinion and the dissent supported their positions
with Utah precedent. In the end, it must be admitted that there are
Utah cases supporting each side of the debate as to the appropriate
standard of review. This debate ultimately seems to hinge on conflict
over whether the rights guaranteed in the open courts clause are
important, substantial, or fundamental rights that must be protected
by heightened constitutional scrutiny. There is no clear answer to
this question, and Utah case law is hopelessly confused.
There is, however, an alternative to both of these standards—one
which could potentially resolve the conflict and properly balance the
competing interests of individual rights and legislative prerogative.
This third option is presented in part in the Utah Court of Appeals
case Currier v. Holden,176 and is in part advocated by other states.177
This approach involves analyzing the two types of Utah open courts
protections, procedural and substantive,178 differently. First, when
acts—legislative or judicial—affect the procedures for gaining access
to the courts, special protection is required. According to the
alternative standard, heightened scrutiny is always proper in such
cases. Thus, statutes that allow a party to create extensive delays in
jury trials,179 limit or eliminate the jurisdiction of the courts, require
payment of large fees to enter the courthouse, mandate arbitration
or referral to a review board,180 or retroactively change the law181
would be subject to heightened scrutiny. This would help prevent
the legislature from improperly limiting the jurisdiction of the
176. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
177. Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 215–16 (Ky. 1955); Murphy v.
Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 113–14 (Md. 1992); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 599–601
(Mass. 1971); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Mo. 1979).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. Although there is debate as to whether
the open courts clause should provide substantive protections, Utah cases have consistently held
that it does. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
179. See Werner, 280 S.W.2d at 214.
180. See Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d at 109.
181. See Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261 (Ala. 1939).
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courts. Those joining Wood’s lead opinion would presumably
disagree with this standard, but it properly advances one of the main
purposes of Utah’s open courts clause—“prevent[ing the legislature]
from closing the doors of the courts against any person who has a legal
right which is enforceable in accordance with some known
remedy.”182
According to this alternative standard, the substantive
protections of the open courts clause are accorded a different
treatment. In Currier, the court determined that the standard of
review used in open courts cases may change depending on the right
asserted.183 The court implicitly recognized that there are no
fundamental rights necessarily found in the substantive protections
of article I, section 11. Rather, the nature of the rights protected by
the open courts clause depends on the remedy at issue. For a remedy
to be needed, there must have been a violation of a person’s rights.
It is the violated rights, not the right to a remedy, that this
alternative view would evaluate in determining the appropriate
standard of review.
The Currier court indicated that “the nature of the individual
right impacted by a statute influences the level of scrutiny which a
court should employ in examining that legislation.”184 If a statute
interferes with “civil liberties,”185 “individual liberties,”186 or
“right[s] established by . . . the state constitution,”187 it would
trigger heightened scrutiny. The alternative view would also hold
that when the need for a remedy arises due to violation of a
fundamental or important constitutional right,188 heightened scrutiny
would be proper in evaluating legislative abrogation of that remedy.
For example, legislation eliminating a cause of action for regulatory
182. Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366–67 (Utah 1915) (emphasis added).
183. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“Having
determined that the statute at issue . . . creates a significant impairment of an important
constitutionally based personal right, we conclude the challenge[] require[s] h[eightened]
scrutiny.”).
184. Id. at 1364.
185. Id. (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing
Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (Utah 1941))).
186. Id.
187. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348,
370 (Utah 1989)).
188. The article I rights that Chief Justice Durham lists are good examples of important
rights that trigger heightened scrutiny. See Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436,
450–51 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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takings would be subject to heightened scrutiny since it involves a
constitutional right,189 whereas a shortening of a particular statute of
limitations, assuming it did not implicate any fundamental rights,
would be analyzed under a deferential standard of review.190
This alternative view provides a way out of the dilemma of the
lead opinion’s “always deferential” standard and the dissent’s “always
heightened scrutiny” standard. The Court of Appeals of Maryland—
that state’s highest tribunal—has advocated a form of this
approach.191 In Murphy v. Edmonds,192 the plaintiffs challenged a
statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases
under the Maryland open courts clause.193 In analyzing this claim,
the court stated that a higher standard is implicated “with regard to
causes of action to recover for violations of certain fundamental
rights” where a statute would cause “an abrogation of access to the
courts which would leave the plaintiff totally remediless.”194
However, “the abolition of some common law causes of action,
without providing an alternate remedy,” would not be held to the
higher standard.195 Thus, where fundamental rights are abrogated by
statute, the courts will examine the statute more strictly than where
such rights are not at issue.
This alternative approach would both permit the legislature to
act and properly protect individual rights. Where a cause of action
arises due to a violation of important individual rights, abrogation of
that cause of action would be carefully scrutinized.196 Otherwise, the
legislature would be afforded deference.197 This approach has the
added benefit of eliminating the debate over whether the rights
guaranteed by the open courts clause are “important” or
189. See UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.”).
190. Such a statute could still be invalidated under a more deferential standard of review
if it were shown to unreasonably limit access to the courts. It would, however, be presumed
valid absent such a showing.
191. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); see also Phillips, supra note 23,
at 1336 (“[S]ome opinions use different standards of scrutiny based on the nature of the right
being infringed.” (citing Murphy, 601 A.2d at 113–14)).
192. 601 A.2d 102.
193. Id. at 104 n.1; see MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 19.
194. Murphy, 601 A.2d at 113.
195. Id. at 114.
196. This would avoid the weakness of the lead opinion’s standard of review—too little
protection of individual rights against legislative abuse.
197. Thus, this approach avoids the dissent’s weakness—limitation of legislative prerogative.
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“fundamental.”198 Rather, it allows the court to individually examine
the rights asserted and determine their importance—a plaintiff could
not bootstrap his claim into triggering heightened scrutiny merely by
claiming a violation of the open courts clause. Although neither
Wood opinion considers or adopts this approach, such an approach
avoids the weaknesses of each opinion’s standard of review.
B. Constitutionality Under the Open Courts Challenge
Although there was a majority decision as to the proper standard
of review in open courts cases, there was an even divide on the issue
of constitutionality. Whether the Wrongful Life Act is constitutional
under Utah’s open courts clause is thus still an open question. This
section explores the lead and dissenting opinions, and suggests that,
although the lead opinion did not use heightened scrutiny, which a
majority of the court held was the proper standard, that failure did
not affect the analysis; the lead opinion still came to the correct
conclusion—that the Act is constitutional.
1. The lead opinion’s application of the Berry test
Justice Wilkins, the author of the lead opinion, dissented in
Laney, where he called for the overruling of Berry.199 Although he
stated in Wood that he was “still firmly convinced that the decision in
Laney to adhere to the Berry interpretation and test was erroneous,”
he applied the Berry test because “Laney is controlling precedent
from this court, and we are cognizant of and respect the principle of
stare decisis which gives stability and predictability to our legal
system.”200
198. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
199. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1028 (Utah 2002) (Wilkins, J., dissenting)
(“In my view the current interpretation of the Open Courts Clause originating with Berry . . . ,
and the accompanying Berry test, places this court outside of its constitutional role and creates
separation of powers problems. I would overturn Berry in favor of the more procedural
interpretation of the Open Courts Clause advanced in our jurisprudence prior to, and since,
Berry.”).
200. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 441 n.1 (Utah 2002). This respect
for precedent may initially seem odd, given his decision in the immediately preceding
paragraph of his opinion to disregard recent standard of review cases. However, although no
post-Berry majority has ever rejected that case, Part IV.A of this Note shows the substantial
disagreement as to appropriate open courts standard of review. In rejecting some standard of
review conclusions, Justice Wilkins was simply selecting from two competing interpretations
that had each garnered a majority. Notably, Justice Wilkins does not indicate that he would
not overrule Berry, given the right case and the right composition of the court. He noted only
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The lead opinion’s application of Berry is relatively
straightforward and simple. The opinion observes that to answer the
first prong of the test, whether an alternative remedy is provided,201
the court must first answer the implicit question of “whether the
statute abrogated an existing remedy or cause of action” at all.202
According to Day v. State,203 this is a question of whether the
remedy existed at the time of the enactment of the statute204—for
the Wrongful Life Act, the year 1983205—and was abrogated by the
statute.206 The Wood plaintiffs claimed that the Wrongful Life Act
abrogated remedies for both “professional negligence” and “medical
malpractice,” which they claimed existed in 1983 when the statute
was enacted.207 “In other words, according to plaintiffs, their claim is
simply a negligence claim, and because of the [Wrongful Life Act],
their claim that would have been valid prior to the statute is now no
longer available.”208 However, the lead opinion refused to evaluate
the claim as a general professional malpractice claim.209 Instead, it
asked whether wrongful birth was recognized as a cognizable claim
in Utah when the statute was enacted.
In answering this question, the lead opinion first noted that “[a]t
common law, no cause of action existed for . . . wrongful birth.”210
More importantly, it continued, “this court has never recognized the
tort of wrongful birth in Utah.”211 To support this latter assertion,
the opinion cited two prior Utah Supreme Court cases that dealt
with the tort of wrongful birth. Although the decision in Payne ex
rel. Payne v. Myers212 was issued after 1983, because the plaintiffs’
that “we apply the Berry test to the instant case to reach the decision of this court.” Id.
(emphasis added).
201. See supra text accompanying note 34.
202. Wood, 67 P.3d at 442.
203. 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999).
204. Id. at 1184. Day clearly rejects the alternative—asking whether the remedy existed at
the time of statehood. Id.
205. Act of Feb. 28, 1983, ch. 167, 1983 Utah Laws 687.
206. Day, 980 P.2d at 1183–85.
207. Wood, 67 P.3d at 441.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 442.
210. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn.
1986) (citing Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 55, 125A (5th ed. 1984))).
211. Id.
212. 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987).
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claims arose before the Act was passed,213 recognition of the tort of
wrongful birth would have established it as existing before the Act
was passed. On this issue, the Payne court stated that “[a]ssuming,
but not deciding, that Utah jurisprudence should recognize an
action for wrongful birth, it is necessary to determine precisely when
the parents’ cause of action accrued.”214 The court ultimately had no
need to decide whether such a cause of action existed, because it
would have been barred anyway by governmental immunity.215
The second case, C.S. v. Nielson216 also involved a claim for
wrongful birth. However, in that case, the court distinguished claims
for wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful birth.217 It
defined wrongful birth as a “cause of action whereby parents claim
they would have avoided conception or terminated an existing
pregnancy by abortion but for the negligence of those charged
with . . . prenatal testing or counseling.”218 Nevertheless, the Nielson
court determined that the “instant case is correctly viewed as
involving a wrongful pregnancy cause of action,” not a wrongful
birth action.219
According to the lead opinion in Wood, although both Payne and
Nielson “noted that other states were almost unanimous in their
recognition of a [wrongful birth] cause of action,” neither case
recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth in Utah.220 “At best,
it was unclear whether such a cause of action might have been
recognized by th[e] court prior to 1983, if it had decided the issue.
The fact remains, though, that no such decision was made . . . .”221
Because Payne and Nielson are the only Utah cases relevant to the
issue, “the tort of wrongful birth did not exist in Utah in 1983.”222
Therefore, because the Wrongful Life Act did not abrogate an
213. See id. at 188 n.4.
214. Id. at 188–89 (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 188.
216. 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).
217. Id. at 506.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 443 (Utah 2002).
221. Id. The opinion further stated that “[i]n the absence of a declaration by this court
either recognizing, or refusing to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature
set forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be recognized in Utah . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added).
222. Id.
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existing legal remedy when it was passed in 1983, the first prong of
the Berry test was not even implicated. There was thus no need to
analyze the second prong, which assumes abrogation of a remedy.223
The lead opinion concluded that “the legislation in question was a
constitutional exercise of legislative authority that did not violate the
Open Courts Clause.”224
2. The dissent’s application of the Berry test
The dissent, applying the Berry test, came to a different
conclusion. The basis for the difference was that the dissent found
the lead opinion’s evaluation of the claim too narrow. In essence, the
dissent agreed with the plaintiffs that “wrongful birth” should not be
viewed as a separate cause of action, but merely as a form of medical
malpractice.225 It quoted from a Berry footnote stating that “[w]hat
section 11 is primarily concerned with is not particular, identifiable
causes of action as such, but with the availability of legal remedies for
vindicating the great interest that individuals . . . have in the integrity
of their persons, property, and reputations.”226 The dissent argued
that the inquiry should not be just “whether or not, on the day the
Act was passed, there was a specific cause of action entitled ‘wrongful
birth.’ The inquiry must focus on the nature of the harm and the
recognition that it . . . [is] cognizable at law.”227
The dissent then answered the implicit question of whether a
remedy was actually abrogated in the affirmative. The Wood
plaintiffs, the dissent asserted, were injured in person228 and in
property229 by the alleged malpractice of the Medical Center.
According to the dissent, they would have had a remedy available at
the time the Wrongful Life Act was enacted—“[t]here is no question
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“The ‘wrongful birth’ cause of action is
nothing more than a legal remedy for medical malpractice based on negligence.”).
226. Id. at 451 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 n.4 (Utah 1985) (quoting Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357,
1360–61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993))).
227. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
228. “[T]heir personal right to make informed, lawful decisions regarding medical
treatments and procedures [w]as subverted by the admitted negligence of the defendant.” Id.
(Durham, C.J., dissenting). Apart from this assertion, the facts as given in the opinions do not
otherwise indicate that the Medical Center admitted negligence.
229. “The right to be compensated for a personal injury is a property right . . . .” Id.
(Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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that a claim for medical malpractice [based on negligence] existed in
1983.”230 Therefore, the dissent concluded, there was an available
remedy for those in the plaintiffs’ position that was abrogated by the
Wrongful Life Act.231
The dissent also relied on other court decisions to show that
there was a recognition of wrongful birth claims in Utah. Of Payne
and Nielson, the dissent said: “five years after the Act was passed in
1983, this court assumed, albeit without specifically deciding, that a
wrongful birth cause of action already existed in Utah.”232 The
dissent also quoted the Payne court’s holding that the plaintiffs in
that case were not denied their open courts rights “because [when
their wrongful birth claim arose] they still had an opportunity to seek
redress in the courts.”233 The Utah Court of Appeals,234 the Kansas
Supreme Court,235 and even the Utah Supreme Court in Nielson,236
according to the dissent, also concluded that Utah recognizes a
wrongful birth cause of action.237 Finally, since Utah has joined a
majority of states in recognizing a “wrongful pregnancy” cause of
action “based upon a ‘negligently performed or counseled
sterilization procedure or abortion,’” the dissent concluded that
Utah must also recognize a similar negligence cause of action in
wrongful birth situations.238
Having concluded that a remedy was abrogated, the dissent
examined the first prong of the Berry test—whether the Act provided
“an effective and reasonable alternative remedy”—and concluded

230. Id. at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 453 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Act has precluded them from
pursuing any remedy . . . .”).
232. Id. at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citing Payne ex rel. Payne v.
Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987)).
234. State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
235. Arche v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990).
236. The dissent observed that “the [Nielson] court . . . noted that courts ‘have been
almost unanimous in their recognition of a [wrongful birth] cause of action . . . .’ Nielson did
not except Utah from that list.” Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 506 n.4 (Utah 1988)).
237. Id. at 454–55 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing Nielson, 767 P.2d at 506).
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that it did not.239 Since the Act does not even purport to provide an
alternative, this was an easy analysis.240
The dissent then analyzed the second Berry prong—whether
“there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.”241 The dissent
argued that since the Act, on its face, “does not identify a social or
economic evil to be eliminated,” deeper analysis is necessary.242
Looking at “the language of the Act and . . . its history,” the dissent
concluded that “it is clear that its purpose was to eliminate or reduce
opportunities for the exercise of the lawful choice to abort a fetus
with a prenatally diagnosed defect.”243 Because “the right to choose
whether or not to abort is . . . protected in Utah, . . . as well as part
of a fundamental right to privacy[,] . . . it cannot be considered a
‘social evil’ for the purposes of article I, section 11.”244 The dissent
concluded that since this was the only purpose identified in the
history and language of the Act, there was no evil to be eliminated,
and the Act also fails the second prong of the Berry analysis.245
3. The lead opinion came to the proper conclusion
Neither opinion in Wood provided an analysis compelling to a
majority of the court, leaving the question open. The lead opinion
even purported to use a standard of review contrary to that upheld
by the majority of the court.246 Nonetheless, this section argues that
the lead opinion came to the correct determination—that the Act is
constitutional under the Utah open courts clause.

239. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
240. The dissent indicated that the Act’s abrogation of a remedy without providing an
alternative created an unfair distinction—plaintiffs are allowed or denied a remedy based solely
on the kind of medical advice provided. The Nielson plaintiff was allowed to recover based on
“negligen[t] . . . provision of information about sterilization.” Id. at 456 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting). However, due to the Act, plaintiffs are denied recovery for negligent “provision of
genetic counseling.” Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting). The Wood dissent argued that it would be
“unfair [if] some victims of medical malpractice have remedies and others do not, even when
the nature of the malpractice and of the injuries is identical.” Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
241. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
242. Wood, 67 P.3d at 456 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 456–57 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 65–71.
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Ultimately, the heated debate about the appropriate standard of
review was essentially irrelevant to the lead opinion’s analysis. The
standard of review question would affect the degree of scrutiny
applied to the Act and perhaps the burden of proof or degree of
proof required.247 However, Justice Wilkins based his conclusion on
the determination that the tort of wrongful birth never existed in
Utah.248 This decision surely would have been the same regardless of
the standard used—the existence or nonexistence of a cause of action
does not depend on the standard of review used.249 It was therefore
immaterial that the lead opinion used a standard other than that
upheld by a majority for open courts cases.
The dissent’s attempts to show that Utah did recognize wrongful
birth prior to 1983 are unavailing. The dissent asserted that the
Payne court “assumed, albeit without specifically deciding, that a
wrongful birth cause of action already existed in Utah.”250 Despite
the dissent’s attempt to downplay the significance of the
“[a]ssuming, but not deciding”251 language, it is a foundational
principle that “ordinarily, a decision is not a precedent on matters
assumed therein, but not decided.”252 Even if that language is
disregarded, the dissent is mistaken—the Payne court did not assume
that a wrongful birth cause of action “already existed,” but rather
that “Utah jurisprudence should recognize an action for wrongful
birth.”253 The difference is significant because, at most, the Payne
court was expressing an opinion, in dictum, that a wrongful birth
cause of action should be recognized in Utah, not that such a cause of
action was recognized. The dissent further asserts that the Utah
Court of Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court read Payne as
recognizing a wrongful birth cause of action in Utah.254 However,

247. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57.
248. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 442.
249. Recognizing or prohibiting causes of action depending on the standard of review
used would lend an air of uncertainty and unpredictability to the law, and would almost
certainly prove unworkable.
250. Wood, 67 P.3d at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
251. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987).
252. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 162 (2003). Note also that “[b]ecause the question of whether a
cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, it may be assumed without being
decided.” 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 308 (2003).
253. Payne, 743 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added).
254. See Arche v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 479 (Kan. 1990); State v. Shipler,
869 P.2d 968, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“[I]n an action for wrongful birth and wrongful
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the Utah case was an action to reduce a conviction for felony theft to
a misdemeanor and the court cited Payne merely for the proposition
that “rights accrue only when the prerequisites for filing an action
are fulfilled.”255 The Kansas court noted only that “Arizona,
California, and Utah have sometimes been cited as states recognizing
the action [of wrongful birth], but the issue has not been clearly
presented and determined in those states”256—hardly a persuasive
recognition.
Although not offered by the dissent, it could be argued that
wrongful birth should be recognized because if it had been
considered prior to 1983, the courts would have recognized it. This
claim is not only speculative but is also irrelevant. As the Wood
dissent noted, “[t]he first step in [the Berry test] is to determine
whether the Act abrogated an existing legal remedy.”257 That the
justices on the Utah Supreme Court prior to 1983 would have been
willing to create a cause of action for wrongful birth does not mean
that such a remedy existed. As the lead opinion stated, “[i]n the
absence of a declaration by this court either recognizing, or refusing
to recognize, a cause of action for wrongful birth, the legislature set
forth the law, declaring that claims for wrongful birth would not be
recognized in Utah.”258
The dissent’s strongest contention is that wrongful birth is
merely a subcategory of medical malpractice. Indeed, several states
have followed this line of reasoning in evaluating wrongful birth
claims.259 Although those states may distinguish “wrongful birth” as
a separate kind of malpractice claim, they use an analysis identical to
life, the Utah Supreme Court held that the causes of action did not accrue until the birth of
the gravely ill child.”).
255. Shipler, 869 P.2d at 970.
256. Arche, 798 P.2d at 479.
257. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 453 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 443. Note also that “the statute in question did not operate either to
extinguish a cause of action after it had accrued or to limit the remedies available; it simply
prevented one from ever arising.” Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988) (referring
to the repudiation of loss-of-consortium actions by the Married Women’s Act of 1898).
259. See, e.g., Wood, 67 P.3d at 454 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citing supreme court
decisions from Indiana, Delaware, Kansas, and Washington); see also Greco v. United States,
893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995) (finding that there is “no reason for compounding or
complicating our medical malpractice jurisprudence by according this particular form of
professional negligence action some special status apart from presently recognized medical
malpractice or by giving it the new name of ‘wrongful birth’”).
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that used in “garden-variety medical malpractice claim[s].”260
Nonetheless, this claim fails when applied to Utah. Wrongful birth
has not been viewed as subsumed in medical malpractice in Utah,
even if wrongful pregnancy has.261 The dissent does not challenge
the assertion that wrongful birth did not exist at common law,262 and
no statute or decision in Utah ever recognized it. For it to exist at
the time of Wood, this cause of action would have had to spring into
existence from a vacuum. In fact, the dissent’s statement that
because Utah has chosen to recognize a “wrongful pregnancy” cause
of action, it must therefore also recognize wrongful birth, proves too
much. The court in Nielson took great pains to distinguish
“wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth” actions,263 recognizing
the former but not the latter. If, as the Wood dissent claimed, both of
these are merely “garden-variety medical malpractice claim[s],”264
then why go to the trouble of distinguishing them at all? The Nielson
court obviously felt that there was an important difference. That
these two claims are separated and analyzed distinctly in Utah
indicates that recognition of one does not imply recognition of the
other.
In addition, many states do not accept wrongful birth causes of
action or view them as subsumed in medical malpractice claims. The
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that “the establishment of
wrongful birth . . . [is] best within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
legislature.”265 The Supreme Court of Georgia declared that “our
current malpractice statute does not encompass a wrongful birth
claim.”266 The Supreme Court of North Carolina indicated that
“claims for relief for wrongful birth of defective children shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction absent a clear mandate by the
legislature.”267 Although the majority of states have chosen to
recognize such claims, Utah is certainly not alone in not having done
so.268 Even some of the states that have recognized wrongful birth
260. Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
261. See C.S. v. Nielsen, 767 P.2d 504, 509 (Utah 1988).
262. See Wood, 67 P.3d at 452–57 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
263. 767 P.2d at 506.
264. Wood, 67 P.3d at 455 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
265. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986).
266. Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ga. 1999).
267. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. 1985).
268. It should be noted that the Act does not prohibit eventual recognition of any and all
“wrongful birth” claims. Although it prohibits a cause of action for those who argue that they
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claims have established it as a separate tort, not as part of medical
malpractice. Ultimately, “[b]ecause no right existed at common law
to recover . . . , the legislature is free to limit . . . liability in that area
without implicating the open courts clause . . . .”269
Because the tort of wrongful birth was never recognized in Utah
prior to its enactment, the Wrongful Life Act did not abrogate an
existing cause of action and is therefore constitutional under Berry.
But, even if the Act is deemed to have abrogated an existing cause of
action, it should still be held constitutional. The second prong of
Berry270 is whether “there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.”271 The
dissent looked past the plain language of the Act to the history of its
adoption, asserting that on its face, the Act “does not identify a
social or economic evil to be eliminated.”272 The Utah standard,
however, is that “[w]hen examining a statute, we look first to its
plain language as the best indicator of the legislature’s intent and
purpose in passing the statute.”273 The first section of the Act states
that it is the public policy of Utah “to encourage all persons to
respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age,
development, condition or dependency, including all persons with a
disability and all unborn persons.”274 This language indicates that the
legislature was trying to eliminate two “clear social evils”—
discrimination against the developmentally disabled and emotional
damage to children whose parents bring wrongful birth claims.275
First, the Utah legislature was trying to promote respect for the
lives of all citizens—even the disabled. By allowing parents to recover
for the unwanted birth of a disabled child, it sends a message to the
would otherwise have chosen to abort, it does not provide a similar bar in the case where a
parent would have avoided pregnancy altogether but for negligent advice from physicians. This
latter type of wrongful birth claim, unavailable to the already-pregnant couple in Wood, could
potentially yet be recognized in Utah.
269. See McCorvey v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993).
270. Because the Act did not provide an alternative remedy, the first Berry prong is
inapplicable.
271. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
272. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 456 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting).
273. Id. at 445 (quoting Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah
1998)).
274. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (2002).
275. Cf. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
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disabled that they are of less value.276 As an early wrongful birth case
stated, “[o]ne of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that
life—whether experienced with or without a major physical
handicap—is more precious than non-life.”277 Respect for that life
was one reason, obvious from the language of the Act, for
prohibiting wrongful birth claims. As another court stated,
proscribing wrongful birth claims “reflect[s] the state’s view that a
handicapped child should not be deemed better off dead and of less
value than a ‘normal’ child.”278 Second, prohibiting wrongful birth
claims out of respect for life, even of the disabled, indicates that the
Utah legislature was trying to prevent emotional harm to disabled
children. As one court stated, if claims of this type are allowed, “[w]e
are . . . convinced that the damage to the child will be significant;
that being an unwanted [child] . . . who will someday learn that its
parents did not want it and, in fact, went to court to force someone
else to pay for its raising, will be harmful to that child.”279 One
commentator persuasively noted that if wrongful birth actions are
allowed, “even though a child will have independent evidence of his
or her parent’s love, there will always be contradictory evidence (and
a court transcript) to prove that the child’s parents convinced a jury
that the child was unwanted and would have been aborted if the
opportunity had presented itself.”280 These concerns vindicate the
stated purpose of the legislature, and there is nothing arbitrary or
unreasonable about the method selected—the legislature properly
sought to eliminate a clear social evil.281
Ignoring section 78-11-23, however, the dissent concluded that
“it is clear that [the Act’s] purpose was to eliminate or reduce
276. Paula Bernstein, Comment, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Why Traditional
Tort Principles Do Not Apply to Wrongful Birth Actions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
297, 321 (2001) (“When a state allows wrongful birth actions, . . . it sends a pernicious
message to its citizens with disabilities; that the state places a higher value on its ‘normal’
citizens.”).
277. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979).
278. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993).
279. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).
280. Bernstein, supra note 276, at 320.
281. Allowing wrongful birth actions also implicates the problem of “eugenics as a birth
policy whereby doctors are sued for not weeding out the unfit.” Monique Ann-Marie Croon,
Note, Taylor v. Kurapati, the Court of Appeals of Michigan’s Decision of Refusing to Recognize
the Tort of Wrongful Birth, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 317, 339 (2002) (quoting Matthew
Rarely, Sliding into Eugenics?, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, at 31).
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opportunities for the exercise of the lawful choice to abort a fetus
with a prenatally diagnosed defect.”282 This is a logical leap that finds
no basis in the language of the Act.283 As stated in the lead opinion,
“where the legislative purpose is expressly stated and agreed to as
part of the legislation, we do not look to the [legislative history] in
determining the intent of the statute.”284 The dissent improperly
found that the sole purpose of the Act was to burden abortion and
that “there is no . . . evil identified.”285 In looking past the language
of the Act, and its implications, the dissent ignores the factors that
would satisfy the second prong of the Berry test.286
V. CONCLUSION
After the dust from Wood had settled, the Utah Wrongful Life
Act was still standing, although barely. A unique combination of
concurrences and dissents produced a confusing decision, particularly
with relation to the open courts clause of the Utah constitution. This
Note demonstrates that, although a majority in Wood upheld
heightened scrutiny as the proper standard of review in open courts
cases, there was no majority opinion as to the constitutionality of the
Act under that analysis. Because the court was equally divided on this
issue, the decision of the lower court that the Act is constitutional
was affirmed.

282. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 456 (Utah 2002) (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting).
283. Despite the evidence of individual legislator’s intent, see supra note 11, the Wood
lead opinion properly noted that “[l]egislators may decide that a statute should be passed for
myriad, often even different, reasons . . . .” Id. at 445.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 457 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
286. Because it found no abrogation of an existing legal remedy, the lead opinion did not
expressly evaluate the second Berry prong. However, in a footnote, Justice Wilkins indicated
that “this case reveals an inherent problem with the Berry test, that it ‘simply sets forth a
framework for justifying the policy position of a majority of the members of this court.’” Id. at
443 n.3 (quoting Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1031 (Utah 2002)). His argument is
that because both the plaintiffs and the defendants may have reasonable positions as to the
existence of an evil, the court simply must choose which “evil” it prefers. However, this
mischaracterizes the Berry test. The balancing of evils, even under Berry, is left to the
legislature. As long as the statute remedies a “clear social or economic evil [and is] nonarbitrary or reasonable,” Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah
1985), it should be upheld—regardless of whether there are competing evils that are not
eliminated. Because the legislature did identify and intend to remedy a clear social evil, the Act
passes even this second part of the Berry test.
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This Note illustrates that between the two extremes of the lead
and dissenting opinions on the appropriate standard of review lies a
middle ground, used in part by both the Utah Court of Appeals in
Currier and the courts of other states. This Note also recommends
that standard for future analyses because it appropriately balances the
concerns of individual rights and legislative prerogative in open
courts cases. Finally, this Note evinces that, regardless of the
standard of review used, the Utah Wrongful Life Act should be
upheld under the controlling Berry test. The Wrongful Life Act did
not abrogate an existing legal remedy, and even if it had, the Act is
supported by a strong public policy: eliminating the clear social evils
of discrimination against and emotional harm to the disabled.
Glenn E. Roper.∗

∗ I would like to thank the BYU LAW REVIEW staff for their excellent suggestions and
criticisms—this Note is vastly improved due to their efforts. I am also forever indebted to Julie
Roper for her unending support and confidence.
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